Ukrainian forces are only just getting started in repelling Russia’s invaders, but I assume there are some great minds inside and outside Ukraine who are provisionally preparing for a post-war outcome that’s most likely to support Ukraine’s ongoing independence, territorial integrity, democratic governance, peace, and prosperity over the long term. So let’s start thinking about what are the “must haves” and the “nice to haves” in a future post-war arrangement. Here are the basic principles I see as essential:
”Must Haves”
- Aggression cannot be rewarded — it must be penalized. Technically even the Empire of Japan did not unconditionally surrender, but aggressors must lose and must be seen to have lost in terms of the war itself. However, a little domestic “face saving” might be OK. (For Japan it was quiet preservation of a defenestrated emperor, an emperor who at least made a helpful radio broadcast at the end.) And even aggressors can be big winners in the post-war world as long as they behave well. Post-World War II Japan is prospering, properly so.
- Relatedly, Ukraine shouldn’t be unduly pressured. (Attention: Emmanuel Macron!) The Ukrainian people have to live with the outcome of this especially horrific war, and fundamentally they ought to decide what their post-war world looks like. Outside parties can certainly provide a great conference table, and great diplomats with excellent suggestions, but that’s about as far as it ought to go.
- Not repeating history. Nobody (except perhaps Vladimir Putin and some of his supporters) wants to repeat 2014 and 2022. This next peace needs to be durable if at all possible. Russia at least under its current leadership obviously poses a continuing threat to its neighbors and beyond. This risk must be firmly contained in lasting fashion.
- Recognition of realities, at least the long-term and lingering ones. For example, there really are millions of native Russian speakers living in Ukraine. Many still feel culturally attached to Russia, to some degree. (Perhaps less so now, but still.) Violence and aggression were never the ways to respond to any legitimate concerns they have, but they might still have legitimate concerns that should be respected.
It’s way too early to predict with confidence, but here are some of the possible desirable features in a future post-war settlement:
- Restoration of Ukraine’s ~2013 (pre-2014) borders.
- A built-in expectation that Ukraine will join the European Union (and Eurozone, and Schengen Area) reasonably soon.
- Carefully defined autonomy for Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea within Ukraine. (There are many successful models of state/provincial autonomy within peaceful nations.) May include possible future (at least 15+ years from now) referenda on independence and/or re-affiliation.
- Full right of return. Everyone who was kidnapped, displaced, or otherwise fled their homes must be able to return without coercion or undue burdens. Russia must pay for the transportation of any/all returnees.
- Some reasonable answer to the Transnistria question. Probably fundamentally the same answer as Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea — carefully defined autonomy within Moldova, possible future referenda, and the Russian government/forces drawn down and kept out.
- United Nations buffer zones and peacekeepers based in the autonomous regions within Ukraine and Moldova.
- Ukraine in NATO (if it wishes, and presumably it does) but with an important asterisk. NATO’s borders would not extend into Donetsk, Luhansk, or Crimea unless and until those autonomous regions vote (in a free, fair, and internationally supervised plebiscite) 15+ years from now to remain part of Ukraine. Even then NATO would permanently avoid basing troops or weapons in Donetsk, Luhansk, or Crimea — or even to train in those areas. In other words, if they vote to remain part of Ukraine they would be non-NATO militarized but fully NATO treaty-defended regions within Ukraine. The rest of Ukraine would be NATO militarized any time it wishes. (It’s getting that way already.) Prior to plebiscites Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea, and Transnistria would be U.N. peacekeeping missions.
- The Russian Navy’s lease on Sevastopol would have to come to an end substantially earlier than currently scheduled unless Ukraine and Russia decide otherwise. However, it’s possible that Crimea could have some special dispensations. In particular, Crimea could perhaps maintain its own separate customs zone with CISFTA (the free trade zone that Russia leads) and it would also be open to Russian tourists on a visa free basis (with reasonable time limits) as long as they arrive by air, sea, or the Kerch Strait Bridge. (Visa free transit through the rest of Ukrainian territory is not assumed.) Assuming that bridge survives or is repaired. Thus Crimea might remain outside Schengen and the European Union’s custom’s zone. That’d mean internal border checkpoints (people, goods) between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine, but they could be fairly “light touch” checkpoints.
- A respected, expeditious venue (court/tribunal) to adjudicate and resolve peace agreement disputes, with viable and powerful enforcement mechanisms.
- Reparations, but sustainable and not overly onerous ones (cf. Germany, World War I). For example, could a carbon tax levied on Russian oil and gas be reliably collected and used for de-mining and other legitimate post-war needs?
- Russian broadcast media (propaganda) reciprocity. Russian broadcasters would only get media platforms on an equal footing with Ukrainian broadcasters in Russia. For example, if RT wants to broadcast to (potentially) 83% of the population of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea on a 24 hour basis then Russia must facilitate distribution of a Ukrainian channel to at least 83% of the Russian national population plus at least 83% of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea. That is to say Ukraine would maintain a media right of reply.
What factors do you think will shape Ukraine’s post-war future?