by Stephen Yellin
This is Day 1 of a series of articles that covers the run-up to the catastrophe of World War I in July 1914. The diplomatic crisis exactly 100 years ago was sparked by the murder of the main force for peace in the Austro-Hungarian Empire – Archduke Franz Ferdinand, together with his wife Sophie – by a Serbian terrorist. Backed by Germany’s offering of unconditional support in using force to retaliate against Serbia – the infamous “blank check” – the Viennese authorities began preparing a list of demands for the Serbian government to accept or face war. Their demands were deliberately made to ensure war would result.
The ultimatum was finally issued on July 23, 1914, over 3 weeks after the Archduke’s murder. The 12 days that followed are the focus of this series. Feel free to refer to my list of important figures in keeping track of who's who.
(Note: sources for these articles include several non-fiction accounts as well as primary documents available online. I have tried to use sources from different perspectives; for example, Max Hasting's Catastrophe 1914 and Sean McMeekin's July 1914, while both meticulously researched, place the blame for the war on different countries. All photos are from Wikipedia.)
Thursday, July 23rd – the fuse is lit
The government of Austria-Hungary, nominally led by the octogenarian Emperor Franz Joseph but in practice by Foreign Secretary Leopold Berchtold and the military Chief of Staff, General Conrad, sent instructions to its ambassador in Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen. Giesl was ordered to present the ultimatum to the Serbian government between 4 and 5PM, Vienna time. He, together with the inner circle of authorities in Vienna has made every effort to keep their intentions secret. Their ambassadors to Russia and France – the former politically supportive of their “Slav brother” client state, the latter locked in alliance with Russia – pretended nothing was amiss. In Germany the Imperial ministers deliberately kept away from Berlin after issuing the “blank check”; the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg had sent Kaiser Wilhelm II off on a cruise along the Norwegian coast to keep his infamously mercurial sovereign out of the way.
Count Leopold Berchtold, Foreign Secretary and de facto civilian leader of Austria-Hungary in 1914
Yet the ultimatum – or at least the fact that Vienna was planning a forceful response to the Archduke’s murder – has already come to the attention of the governments of the “Great Powers”. As early as July 15th the British ambassador to Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen had been warned by an Austro-Hungarian diplomatic colleague of his government’s intentions – intentions the diplomat had been leaked by none other than Foreign Secretary Berchtold. The next day de Bunsen passed the story on to Russia’s ambassador to Austria-Hungary, who promptly cabled his government to warn them that
“the Austro-Hungarian government…intends to make certain demands on Belgrade”. By July 18th Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic had been informed (almost certainly by St. Petersburg), and he cabled his country’s embassies to assure them he would not accept any demands from Vienna that would violate Serbian sovereignty.
Vienna had timed the issuing of the ultimatum for 4-5PM on July 23rd for very good reasons. First, the Austro-Hungarian army would be ready to mobilize on July 25th following their reservists’ return from harvesting duty. Since Belgrade would only have 48 hours to reject the ultimatum (so at least Vienna hoped they would) that meant the army could mobilize immediately upon rejection.
The other was that Tsar Nicholas II and his government were hosting President Poincare and Prime Minister Viviani of France in St. Petersburg from July 20th through the 23rd. If the ultimatum came to the attention of the Entente allies while Poincare and Viviani were in St. Petersburg the 2 countries could collaborate on a joint response to try and stop Vienna from its (presumed to be easy) conquest of Serbia. The ultimatum was thus planned to be delivered to Pasic by Ambassador Giesl just after the French leaders had embarked on their voyage home from St. Petersburg. When Vienna discovered (thanks to a tip from Berlin) that the French ship was departing later than advertised they had Giesl postpone his visit to Pasic until 6PM to compensate.
Berchtold and Conrad were unaware that the Russians had cracked their diplomatic code; together with the tip from their ambassador, they knew what to expect and when to expect it. While no official account exists of the meetings between the Tsar, Poincare and their advisors during the visit, it is likely that agreement was reached on holding a firm line against Austrian aggression. Even European financiers were in on the plans: as Max Hastings relates, the stock markets in Vienna and Budapest saw “frenzied” activity in the days leading up to the ultimatum based probably on insider information. Sean McMeekin is therefore correct when he says in July 1914 that “the Austrian ultimatum was the worst-kept secret in Europe”.
The Ultimatum
Prime Minister Pasic of Serbia
Giesl arrived at Pasic’s office as scheduled. Much to his surprise, meeting him was not Pasic but the Serbian Finance Minister Laza Pacu. The wily premier had skipped out of town the day before to go campaigning for the upcoming Serbian parliamentary elections and had told Pacu to hold down the proverbial fort in his absence. Pasic as noted above was clearly aware that trouble was brewing, and can only be assumed to have deliberately absented himself from receiving the ultimatum himself. That Pacu spoke no French – the language of diplomacy in 1914 – and Giesl no Serbian made things even more uncomfortable as an interpreter had to be summoned. Nevertheless Giesl presented the ultimatum to Pacu. It contained the following
demands of Serbia to “undertake”:
(1) To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;
(2) To dissolve immediately the society styled "Narodna Odbrana," [“The People’s Will”, the Pan-Serbian nationalist society] to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government [referring to Serbia’s King Peter I] shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;
(3) To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
(4) To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government; [this was directed at officers belonging to Narodna Odbrana such as “Apis”, head of Serbian military intelligence]
(5) To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;
(6) To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th of June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;
(7) To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo; [Tankosic and Ciganovic were known to have helped Princip and his colleagues across the Serbian border and supplied them their guns and bombs]
(8) To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Shabatz Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;
(9) To furnish [Vienna] with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th of June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,
(10) To notify [Vienna] without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.
[Emphasized text is not in original]
Serbia appeals to Russia
Giesl informed Pacu that if Serbia failed to give Vienna a “satisfactory” reply by 6PM on July 25th he and his staff would depart Belgrade at once. Breaking off diplomatic relations was a legal formality before nations declared war in 1914 and Pacu knew this. As soon as Giesl left the Serb frantically summoned his colleagues and notified the Serbian Crown Prince, Alexander. It became clear that accepting Points 5 and 6 of the ultimatum would violate Serbian sovereignty by allowing Austrian officials to investigate and prosecutors its citizens on Serbian soil. While Pasic and his colleagues were willing to accept most of the rest of Vienna’s terms, they believed they had no choice but to reject Points 5 and 6.
Acting in his elderly father’s stead the Crown Prince went that evening to the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Vasily Strandman and asked if Russia would stand by Serbia in the event Austria-Hungary declared war. While unable to give a formal response Strandman urged Alexander to telegraph the Tsar and seek Russian protection, adding that he thought it likely Russia would provide it. Accordingly Alexander telegraphed Nicholas to promise that Serbia would agree to accept whatever Points the Tsar felt appropriate.
Those who blame Serbia for the catastrophe that followed should note a clear distinction between its government and extremists like Princip who its powerful military enabled. There was frequent tension between the civilians such as Pasic and the Serbian military; the latter held almost exclusive control over Narodna Odbrana and kept the government in the dark as to the operations of “Black Hand” militants. Neither King Peter or Pasic had the ability to control the military, either; their leaders had placed the King in power in a 1903 coup d’etat that had seen Apis and his colleagues brutally murder and mutilate the King’s predecessor and his wife. We should certainly blame Gavrilo Princip for murdering Franz Ferdinand and Sophie, and military leaders like Apis for enabling his terrorist act, but unless clear evidence emerges that links the Serbian government to the plot it is unfair to blame Belgrade for World War I. To date no such evidence has been uncovered.
The first reports of the Austrian ultimatum reached St. Petersburg later that evening. Austria-Hungary’s ambassadors would formally present it to their respective capitols the next morning, Friday July 24th. The fuse had been lit; the “July Crisis” had begun.
Stay tuned tomorrow for the next day-by-day account of Countdown to World War I!