that means the same 3-judge panel had NO ONE willing to hear it this time, largely on standing judicial principles.
I have scanned the opinion, which iks a pdf file available at the web site of the court here
below the fold, a couple of extracts from the PDF
Law of the case binds not only the trial court but this court as well. See, e.g., Burger King Corp., 15 F.3d at 169 ("As we have repeatedly recognized, findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial or on a later appeal." (internal marks and citations omitted)); Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("The doctrine is based on the premise that an appellate decision is binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case . . . .");
There are a few discrete exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. It "does not limit the court's power to revisit previously decided issues when (1) new and substantially different evidence emerges at a subsequent trial; (2) controlling authority has been rendered that is contrary to the previous decision; or (3) the earlier ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice if implemented." Klay v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal marks and citation omitted); see also Wheeler, 746 F.2d at 1440. None of those exceptions apply here. Because our previous decision was published, the prior panel precedent rule also applies to any holdings reached in the earlier appeal. "Under the There are a few discrete exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. It "does not limit the court's power to revisit previously decided issues when (1) new and substantially different evidence emerges at a subsequent trial; (2) controlling authority has been rendered that is contrary to the previous decision; or (3) the earlier ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice if implemented." Klay v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal marks and citation omitted); see also Wheeler, 746 F.2d at 1440. None of those exceptions apply here. Because our previous decision was published, the prior panel precedent rule also applies to any holdings reached in the earlier appeal."
The district court is also correct that Defendant Hospice of Florida Suncoast, Inc. is not a "public entity" within the meaning of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1)(A)-(C). Assuming it is a place of "public accommodation," the plaintiffs still have not made a substantial showing on this claim. The Hospice did not remove nutrition and hydration and withhold medication from Theresa Schiavo "on the basis of [her] disability." Instead, the Hospice took these actions pursuant to a valid court order. The ADA was never intended to provide an avenue for challenging court orders in termination of care cases
Count Eight is a procedural due process claim asserting that under Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the Due Process Clause requires that decisions to remove hydration and nutrition from an incapacitated person must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that she would have made the same decision, and that there was not enough evidence in this case to meet that standard. The plaintiffs assured the district court that this was a procedural due process claim. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, _ F. Supp. 2d _, 2005 WL 677224, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2005) (district court order denying plaintiffs' second motion for a temporary restraining order); Tr. pt. I at 16, pt. II at 15 (Mar. 24, 2005 oral arg. before the district court). The plaintiffs have no substantial case on the merits as to this claim for at least two independently adequate reasons. First, Cruzan did not establish that the Constitution requires application of a clear and convincing evidence standard before termination of care. The Supreme Court held in Cruzan only that a state could, if it wished, require that evidence of the incompetent's wishes be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 280, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 ("The question, then, is whether the United States Constitution forbids the establishment of this procedural requirement by the State. We hold that it does not."); id. at 284 ("In sum, we conclude that a State may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state.").
Of course, holding that states may permissibly impose a requirement says nothing about whether states must impose it. One need look no further than the Cruzan opinion itself for that truism. . . .
Second, even if constitutional law did work the way the plaintiffs want, contrary to the explicit teaching of the Supreme Court in the Cruzan opinion itself, they would still not have a substantial case on this claim. Plaintiffs would not, because Florida has adopted the very requirement that they say the Constitution mandates, a clear and convincing evidence standard, and it was applied by the state courts in this case, In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The plaintiffs argue that the state courts should have concluded that the clear and convincing evidence standard was not met in this case, but a quarrel with the result of a proceeding does not state a claim that due process was not afforded. Stated differently, procedural due process does not guarantee a particular result.
I could go on and on -- each of the new claims being raised was systematically rejected by the Circuit Court panel.
It is worth taking the time to read.